

THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

Evidences multiply that there was no adequate comprehension during the summer and fall months of the extent to which the country's trade was restricted by reason of the Presidential campaign. Beneficial indications were misleading, because notwithstanding the repression of activity, such extension of the market had been furnished by the slowed House returns and other data at hand showed little comparative statistics. Other could not, of course, show what would have been the volume of trade had not the Presidential campaign been in progress. If they had been properly considered, however, the tremendous awakening that has followed the election would at least have been foreseen. At all events, it was not plain until from May to November there was an interruption of trade and enterprise, which while it did not fully appear in the data referred to, is now evident in the rebound since the pressure upon the manufacturing of bonds and securities has been removed. The market in question is credit. Routine business went along at its ordinary level. By reason of the present extraordinary development of the country, even routine results fail to meet the reflected reflections. It was, however, in new enterprises and in the extension of those already on foot that the shadow of political uneasiness was the darkest. There was, indeed, a perceptible increase in confidence just prior to the elections, and in consequence, some relaxation in the tension, but definite information had to replace mere confidence before it could be seen what this country is capable of industrially. It was the failure to anticipate this phase of the situation that led to the miscalculations of so many experienced and astute operators in stocks. They blindly followed precedent in a situation for which no precedents may be found.

The attitude of this class in common was that since stock market prices had risen prior to the election, and that since the rise was predicated upon Republican success, it would, according to speculative precedents, culminate with the event. The usual precedents were, indeed, in favor of this theory, and had there been no other reason for the advance so than the election itself, the theory would probably have been fulfilled in practice. It is plain, however, that what was true of trade and enterprise at large applied with equal truth to the market for securities. In short, it would now appear that as regards astute investors, an inadequate conception was entertained as to their uneasiness in relation to the political situation just as in the country, that concern was repressive rather than depressing. It did not find expression in extensive and general liquidation but did lead to the cessation of new buying for investment. Such, indeed, was the general report of those firms marking a necessity of dealing in investments of the higher grade. In this respect, the rebound appears clearly. While, as noted, the stock market did not await the actual issue of the elections, but began to advance some weeks before, it was not upon what is styled panic buying in the real sense of the term. That is clearly shown also in the common tenor of the reports of stock brokers. The steady professional habitues of Wall Street bought stocks just as they laid charges upon the details and the results of the election, and operators of large resources also bought heavily, but in these directions could be found about all the support the market enjoyed prior to Nov. 7. It is necessary to consider this phase of the situation at such length, in order properly to comprehend the subsequent results in the market.

It was then the inherent and inter-related strength of both the industrial and financial situations which caused so faint a cerebral reaction of the repressive political influences of the summer. In use the same influences caused a stock market panic, in no little more than a calm. Throughout the summer, however, forces were accumulating which, when given free vent, were to produce noteworthy results, and the latter are now beginning to make their appearance. It seems only necessary to express the extreme beginning for barring the present recession, the expansion and development of the country, industrial, economic and political, surpasses the range of mortal vision. Events may indeed arise to cloud the outlook, but these character or direction can not now be detected. Perhaps soon yet the extent and the significance of the result of the election of nearly a fortnight ago are not fully comprehended. We think it may be assumed that the credit of the national Government, for example, is now so thoroughly established that it will not again be threatened in the life of this generation. The successful prosecution of a foreign war has given a status to the United States in the world's councils, and while there is not involved therein a deviation from inherited principles of diplomatic action, this country is more than ever secure from the designs and interference of other nations. Not only have pernicious financial and economic laws been repealed, but in their place rest the satisfactory monetary and tariff acts that have played so far in a part in bringing about the existing high state of prosperity. Hence at home and abroad an era of political tranquility seems to be assured.

Any one then desirous of seeing the foundations of the current striking movement in the market for securities need only look about him. He will find them in every quarter to which the intelligent and experienced observer is accustomed to turn in seeking causes for similar phenomena. The present movement in market prices, in fact, needs explanation. It is seldom, indeed, that the investor and the speculator can sit down unbiased by extraneous influences and with pen and paper figure out for himself the approximate worth of a given security. This has before him now the annual reports of the railways, and their earnings, while their prospects are the common to the country at large, which may be summed up in the one word "expansion." Proceeding therefore, he makes no conclusions for himself which will, of course, be qualified by his own personal equation. Facts and statistics make dry reading, but they must be employed, not only in the exercise of judgment by the individual investor, but in any clear estimate of the situation at large. Next to the satisfactory data furnished in railway reports, the investor must bear in mind money market conditions and prospects. In this respect, by far the most interesting figures at hand last week were those setting forth the country's foreign trade for the month of October and the calendar year. In the month, the United States sold to other countries nearly ninety-two and a half million dollars more than it bought of them. The excess of sales for the ten months of the year reached the astounding total of \$90,677,936. Much as is said of the invisible rebates against trade balances, it would be difficult to find counterbalancing charges to such a sum as this. It is not strange then that American investors are now being invited to subscribe to English, German, Swiss and Danish loans. In fact, it is now plain that the Old World can settle its obligations to the New in other ways.

Satisfactory and extraordinary as is the state of the country's foreign trade, a parallel for it may be found in domestic trade conditions. The latest returns at hand show clearly a most pronounced revival in activity has set in, in all lines, notable among which is the removal of political uncertainties, accompanied by the first time in many months, the resumption of diminished stocks and rising prices. The more seasonable weather which has prevailed has been distinctly reflected in the woolen, textile, leather and other important branches of the country's trade. General activity is reflected in the latest clearing house returns, even after making all allowances for the larger figures created by the current tremendous speculation in securities. In fact, the trade reports in general, and those furnished by the technical trade journals in various lines present a plain monotone of expansion and improvement. It is to these data, dry, perhaps, but still significant, that the investor and speculator should now turn, keeping an eye also fixed upon the monetary outlook. There was a perceptible relaxation in the

money market last week, and just as in trade and speculation, it would appear that very considerable amounts of money were, prior to the election, if not hoarded, at least kept at the direct disposal of their owners. Every current indication, however, now is that capital must seek employment, and that its most profitable occupation will be found in securities. Sterling exchange advanced rather steadily throughout the week, not on account of any actual change in international monetary conditions, but most probably in anticipation of the offering here of additional foreign loans. The superfluously unfavorable drift of the foreign exchanges, however, is, for obvious reasons, a matter of little weight, in view of the actual facts of the case. In other words, foreign loans would not be offered here did not those engaged in their flotation recognize that America's commercial supremacy involves the ultimate assumption of the world's financial supremacy also. The direct interests in short, of the banking houses conducting these transactions, are immediately greater than the effects of most of the country's great railways, than they are likely to be in British or German Government bonds, but the country's surplus capital is ample to take care of them all. With existent conditions so strong and an outlook so clear, the present Wall Street point of view need not be marvelled at.

FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

UNITED STATES AND STATE BONDS.

Sales	Name	Open	High	Low	Clos.	Chg.	Chg.	Chg.
16,000 U.S. 8%, 1892	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1893	109 1/2	109 1/2	109 1/2	109 1/2	109 1/2	0	0	0
21,000 U.S. 8%, 1894	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1895	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1896	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	111 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1897	112 1/2	112 1/2	112 1/2	112 1/2	112 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1898	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1899	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1900	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1901	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1902	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1903	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1904	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1905	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1906	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1907	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1908	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1909	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1910	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1911	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1912	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1913	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1914	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1915	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1916	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1917	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1918	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1919	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1920	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1921	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1922	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1923	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1924	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1925	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1926	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1927	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1928	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1929	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1930	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1931	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1932	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1933	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1934	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1935	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1936	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1937	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1938	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1939	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1940	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S. 8%, 1941	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	113 1/2	0	0	0
20,000 U.S								